The Impact of Late-Career Health and Employment Shocks on Social Security and Other Wealth by Dan Murphy et al.
The Impact of Late-Career Health and 
Employment Shocks on 
Social Security and Other Wealth
Richard W. Johnson, Gordon B.T. Mermin, and Dan Murphy
November 2007
  
 
 
 
The Retirement Project 
Discussion Paper 07-07 
 THE URBAN INSTITUTE 2100 M STREET, N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20037 
The Impact of Late-Career Health and
Employment Shocks on 
Social Security and Other Wealth
Richard W. Johnson, Gordon B.T. Mermin, and Dan Murphy
December 2007
 
 
 The Retirement Project 
 
 
The Retirement Project 
 
A crosscutting team of Urban Institute experts in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, tax and budget policy, and 
micro-simulation modeling ponder the aging of American society. 
 
The aging of America raises many questions about what's in store for future and current retirees and whether society 
can sustain current systems that support the retired population. Who will prosper? Who won't? Many good things are 
happening too, like longer life and better health. Although much of the baby boom generation will be better off than 
those retiring today, many face uncertain prospects. Especially vulnerable are divorced women, single mothers, 
never-married men, high school dropouts, and Hispanics. Even Social Security—which tends to equalize the 
distribution of retirement income by paying low-income people more then they put in and wealthier contributors 
less—may not make them financially secure. 
 
Uncertainty about whether workers today are saving enough for retirement further complicates the outlook. New 
trends in employment, employer-sponsored pensions, and health insurance influence retirement decisions and 
financial security at older ages. And, the sheer number of reform proposals, such as personal retirement accounts to 
augment traditional Social Security or changes in the Medicare eligibility age, makes solid analyses imperative. 
 
Urban Institute researchers assess how current retirement policies, demographic trends, and private sector practices 
influence older Americans' security and decision-making. Numerous studies and reports provide objective, 
nonpartisan guidance for policymakers. 
 
The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public 
consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its 
trustees, its funders, or other authors in the series. 
 
The research reported herein was supported by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College pursuant to a 
grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The 
opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or 
policy of the Social Security Administration or any agency of the federal government; the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College; or the Urban Institute, its board, or its sponsors.  
 
The authors are grateful to Melissa Favreault, Richard Woodbury, and Sheila Zedlewski for valuable comments on 
an earlier draft. 
 
Publisher: The Urban Institute, 2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037  
Copyright © 2007. Permission is granted for reproduction of this document, with attribution to the Urban Institute. 

 
i The Retirement Project 
 
 
Contents 
Tables.............................................................................................................................................ii 
 
Abstract .........................................................................................................................................iii 
 
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... iv 
 
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................2 
 
Background.....................................................................................................................................3 
 
Data and Methods ...........................................................................................................................5 
Measuring Health and Employment Shocks...................................................................... 9 
Calculating Social Security Wealth ................................................................................. 10 
Calculating Pension Wealth............................................................................................. 13 
Measuring Other Household Wealth ............................................................................... 14 
Modeling Financial Impact of Negative Shocks.............................................................. 14 
 
Results.......................................................................................................................................... 15 
Impact of Shocks on Social Security Wealth................................................................... 17 
Impact on Social Security Payments in Old Age............................................................. 21 
Impact on Pension and Other Household Wealth ............................................................ 25 
 
Conclusions.................................................................................................................................. 27 
 
References.................................................................................................................................... 32 
 
 
Impact of Late-Career Health and Employment Shocks ii 
 
Tables 
1. Incidence of Health and Employment Shocks between 1992 and the Year Respondents  
Turn 62, Workers Age 51 to 55 in 1992 (percent)......................................................................16 
2. Changes in Social Security Wealth between 1992 and 2004, by Onset of Health and 
Employment Shocks, Workers Age 51 to 55 in 1992.................................................................17 
3. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Change in Social Security Wealth between  
1992 and 2004.............................................................................................................................19 
4. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of the Change between 1992 and 2004 in Social  
Security Wealth Excluding Benefits Received before Age 62 and in Annual Social  
Security Benefits ........................................................................................................................22 
5. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of the Change in Social Security Wealth and Annual 
Social Security Benefits between 1992 and 2004, Controlling for DI Onset .............................24 
6. Change in Pension Wealth and Other Household Wealth between 1992 and 2004, by  
Onset of Health and Employment Shocks ..................................................................................26 
7. Coefficients from Regressions of the Change in Pension Wealth and Other Household  
Wealth between 1992 and 2004..................................................................................................28 
Appendix. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables ........................................................35 
 
 
iii The Retirement Project 
 
 
Abstract 
About one-quarter of workers age 51 to 55 in 1992 developed health-related work limitations and 
about one-fifth were laid off from their jobs before age 62. Although late-career health and 
employment shocks often derail retirement savings plans, Social Security’s disability insurance, 
spouse and survivor benefits, and progressive benefit formula provide important protections. In 
fact, health shocks increase Social Security’s lifetime value, primarily because the system’s 
disability insurance allows some disabled workers to collect benefits before age 62. However, if 
the system’s disability insurance program did not exist, the onset of health-related work 
limitations would substantially reduce Social Security wealth.  
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Executive Summary 
This study examines how late-career health and employment shocks affect future Social Security 
benefits. These shocks are fairly common at older ages and often derail retirement savings plans. 
Health problems typically raise out-of-pocket medical spending and force many workers to retire 
early, leaving people with less money to save for retirement. Older workers displaced from their 
jobs often encounter problems finding work, leading to long unemployment spells. Because 
people typically accumulate much of their retirement savings in the decade or so before they stop 
working, adverse health and employment shocks in the 50s and 60s can substantially erode 
retirement preparedness. 
Social Security may protect people from health and employment shocks at older ages. 
The system’s disability insurance provides relatively generous retirement benefits to those whose 
health problems limited their work histories. Social Security also allows people with low lifetime 
earnings to collect benefits based on their current, divorced, or deceased spouse’s work history. 
Additionally, various features of the benefit formula, such as provisions that base benefits on 
only the highest 35 years of earnings or replace relatively large shares of pre-retirement lifetime 
earnings for those with low income, favor beneficiaries with limited lifetime employment and 
earnings. As a result, pre-retirement health and employment shocks may have smaller effects on 
future Social Security benefits than on financial holdings.  
Traditional employer-sponsored pension benefits, however, may be especially vulnerable 
to health and employment shocks in the years immediately before benefit take-up. Most 
traditional defined benefit plans tie benefits to service years and nominal earnings received near 
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the end of the career. As a result, pension wealth tends to grow rapidly in the years just before 
people qualify for benefits. Many people lose substantial pension wealth if they are laid off from 
their jobs just before qualifying for benefits or are forced by health problems to retire early.  
This study compares the change in Social Security wealth, traditional pension wealth, and 
other household wealth between 1992 and 2004 for workers ages 51 to 55 at study baseline who 
experience health and employment shocks and those who do not. Data come from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of older Americans. Health shocks are defined as 
the onset of health problems that limit the type or amount of work that study respondents can 
perform, and employment shocks refer to job layoffs. The analysis considers only shocks that 
occur between 1992 and the year study respondents turn 62, when people can begin collecting 
Social Security retirement benefits. Social Security and pension wealth computations are based 
on Social Security administrative records and detailed characteristics of employer-provided 
pension plans. Simulations measure how well different features of Social Security, such as the 
progressive benefit formula and the availability of disability benefits and spouse and survivor 
benefits, protect workers who develop health problems. 
Key findings include the following: 
• One-quarter of workers age 51 to 55 in 1992 develop health-related work limitations 
before age 62 and just more than one-fifth are laid off from their jobs. The incidence of 
employment and (especially) health shocks declines with educational attainment. Nearly 
one-third of workers who did not complete high school develop health problems, almost 
twice the disability rate for college graduates. 
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• Job layoffs reduce Social Security wealth accumulation by about $4,700, or 11.9 percent 
of the average increment between 1992 and 2004, after other factors are held constant.  
• Health shocks increase Social Security wealth by about $10,600 over the period, 
primarily because the system’s disability insurance allows some workers with disabilities 
to collect benefits before age 62.  
• If Social Security’s disability insurance program did not exist, the onset of health-related 
work limitations would reduce the growth in Social Security wealth by about $3,800, 
equal to 11.6 percent of the average growth over the period. If spouse and survivor 
benefits and the progressive benefit formula were also eliminated, and the benefit 
formula instead incorporated the top 40 years of earnings and replaced a constant 45 
percent of average indexed earnings for all workers, the negative impact of health shocks 
would jump to about $7,900, equal to 18.6 percent of the average wealth change.  
• Only 24 percent of workers who develop disabilities between age 51 and 62 ever receive 
Social Security disability benefits. The onset of work disabilities among workers who do 
not receive disability benefits reduces Social Security wealth by about $2,400 and annual 
Social Security benefits by about $400.  
• Layoffs reduce pension wealth in traditional employer-sponsored defined benefit plans by 
nearly $30,000, or 37.1 percent of the average growth in pension wealth over the period. 
The onset of work disabilities reduces pension wealth by about $17,800. 
The current Social Security system appears to provide some important protections to 
people experiencing adverse health and employment shocks late in their careers. However, the 
system’s growing financial pressures could soon tear the safety net. Disability benefit costs have 
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been soaring recently, and current projections indicate that Social Security’s disability insurance 
trust fund will be depleted by 2026. Population aging threatens to bankrupt the entire Social 
Security system, with the combined retirement and disability trust fund expected to be depleted 
by 2041, according to the latest projections. How policymakers address this fiscal challenge has 
crucial implications for people who experience late-career health and employment shocks. 
Efforts to control disability insurance costs by tightening eligibility or cutting benefits could 
erode protections for workers developing disabilities. Raising Social Security’s early entitlement 
and normal retirement ages could significantly erode retirement security for people unable to 
remain at work into their mid 60s, especially those who do not qualify for disability benefits. 
Policymakers must carefully consider how reforms designed to improve Social Security’s 
finances could unravel existing protections for disabled and laid-off workers. 
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Introduction 
Health and employment shocks are fairly common at older ages and often derail retirement 
savings plans. About 19 percent of adults age 51 to 61 in 1992 were laid off from their jobs at 
some point before 2002, and about one-third developed serious health problems that limited their 
work ability over the 10-year period (Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello 2005). People who lose 
their jobs in the years leading up to retirement or are forced by health problems to reduce their 
work hours generally have less money available for retirement savings than people who remain 
at work until their planned retirement age. Job loss between the ages of 51 and 71 reduces 
household financial and housing wealth by about 33 percent for single people, when other factors 
are held constant, and the onset of work disability reduces wealth by about 42 percent (Johnson, 
Mermin, and Uccello 2006). The estimated effects are smaller but still substantial for married 
people.  
Social Security may provide some protection from health and employment shocks at 
older ages. The system’s disability insurance provides some people whose health problems 
limited their work histories with more generous retirement benefits than they would otherwise 
receive. Additionally, Social Security allows those with limited earnings to collect benefits based 
on their current, divorced, or deceased spouse’s work history. Various features of the benefit 
formula, such as the provisions that base benefits on only the highest 35 years of earnings or 
replace larger shares of pre-retirement lifetime earnings for those with low income than those 
with high income, also favor those with limited employment histories and lifetime earnings. As a 
result, health and employment shocks in the years leading up to retirement may have smaller 
effects on future Social Security benefits than on financial wealth holdings.  
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Traditional employer-sponsored pension benefits, however, may be especially vulnerable 
to health and employment shocks in the years immediately prior to benefit take-up. Most 
traditional plans tie benefits to years of service and nominal earnings received near the end of the 
career. As a result, pension wealth tends to grow rapidly in the years just before people qualify 
for benefits. An additional year on the job increases future benefits not only by adding an 
additional percentage of pay, but also by raising the value of previous accumulated benefits by a 
combination of real wage growth and inflation. Thus, many people lose substantial pension 
wealth if they are laid off from their jobs just before qualifying for benefits or are forced by 
health problems to retire early.  
This paper examines the impact of health and employment shocks on the value of Social 
Security wealth, traditional employer-sponsored pension wealth, and other household wealth. We 
begin by measuring the incidence of work disability and job layoffs up to age 62 for a sample of 
workers age 51 to 55 at study baseline. We then compare wealth levels for those who do and do 
not experience each type of shock. The final stage of the analysis estimates multivariate models 
to assess the impact of health and employment shocks on each wealth type and annual Social 
Security income, holding other factors constant. Simulations measure how well different features 
of Social Security, such as the progressive benefit formula and the availability of disability 
benefits and spouse and survivor benefits, protect workers who develop health problems.  
The results show that Social Security provides important protections from late-career 
disability and employment shocks. Disability onset increases Social Security wealth because 
many people with disabilities are able to collect benefits early. However, work disabilities reduce 
monthly Social Security payments in old age by forcing people to stop work at relatively young 
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ages, potentially jeopardizing retirement income security. The effects are particularly serious for 
workers with disabilities who do not receive Social Security disability benefits, who make up 
about three-quarters of those who develop disabilities in their 50s and early 60s. Late-career job 
layoffs and health problems substantially reduce growth in traditional pension wealth. 
Background 
Social Security, employer-sponsored pension benefits, and household savings are key 
components of retirement income. In 2004, Social Security benefits accounted for nearly two-
fifths of income for adults age 65 and older, more than half of income for people age 80 and 
older, and more than four-fifths of income for older people in the bottom two-fifths of the 
income distribution (Social Security Administration 2006). Employer-sponsored pensions now 
account for about one-fifth of income at age 65 and older. About 13 percent of income received 
by older adults comes from assets and about 43 percent comes from earnings (although the 
importance of earnings declines sharply with age).  
These sources of retirement income may be vulnerable to health and employment shocks 
in the years leading to retirement. Health problems often raise out-of-pocket medical spending 
(Emanuel et al. 2000; Himmelstein et al. 2005) and force many people to retire early (CBO 2004; 
McGarry 2004). The increase in health care costs and loss of earnings leave people with less 
money to save for retirement. Older workers displaced from their jobs often encounter problems 
finding work (Chan and Stevens 2001), perhaps because employers are reluctant to hire workers 
near the end of their careers or because older people face outright discrimination in the labor 
market (Lahey 2005). Because people typically accumulate much of their retirement savings in 
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the decade or so before they stop working (Engen, Gale, and Uccello 1999), adverse health and 
employment shocks in the 50s and 60s can substantially erode retirement preparedness. 
Health and employment shocks may deal especially harsh blows to pension wealth from 
traditional defined benefit (DB) plans. Although DB plans have been declining recently as 
401(k)-type plans have proliferated and now cover only about one in five wage and salary 
workers in the private sector (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006), they still predominate in the 
public sector and unionized workplaces. These plans provide workers with lifetime annuities that 
begin at retirement and pay regular benefits until death. Benefits are typically expressed as a 
multiple of years of service and earnings received near the end of the career (e.g., 1 percent of 
average salary received during the final three years on the job times the number of years of 
service).1 Participants cannot collect full benefits until reaching the plan’s normal retirement age, 
but most plans allow workers who retire early to collect reduced benefits if they have enough 
seniority. Retirement ages vary across plans. The normal retirement age is set at 65 in about two-
thirds of plans in the private sector, at 62 in about one-sixth of private plans, and at 60 or 55 in 
most of the rest (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). Most plans set the early retirement age at 
55.  
Because future benefits in traditional DB plans rise as workers age and accumulate 
substantial tenure, typically spiking at the plan’s early retirement age and normal retirement age, 
workers who separate from their employer before they are able to collect benefits often lose 
significant pension wealth. An additional year on the job increases future pension benefits not 
only by adding an additional percentage of pay, but also by raising the value of previous 
                                                 
1 Some plans instead pay benefits equal to a fixed dollar amount per service year. 
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accumulated benefits by a combination of real wage growth and inflation. This increment is 
often substantial for workers with lengthy job tenures. Workers displaced from their jobs before 
qualifying for benefits or forced by health problems to leave early miss out on these run-ups in 
pension wealth, potentially resulting in a substantial loss in future benefits. (Employer-provided 
disability benefits could partly offset the loss for workers with health problems, however.)  
Pension losses from early labor force withdrawal tend to be less serious for workers in 
401(k)-type retirement plans, which basically function as tax-advantaged savings accounts to 
which both employers and employees usually contribute. Contributions cease when workers 
leave their jobs, so that participants who stop work early typically end up with smaller balances 
than those who delay retirement, all else equal. However, because account balances grow 
smoothly while workers are on their jobs employment shocks do not cause workers to miss out 
on periods of rapid wealth accumulation, as can be the case with DB pensions. Additionally, as 
long as workers do not withdraw plan funds, existing account balances can continue to earn 
investment returns after workers separate from their employer, softening the impact of health and 
employment shocks on future pension benefits.  
Although Social Security retirement benefits are based on lifetime earnings, the system is 
designed to redistribute income to people with low earnings (Steuerle and Bakija 1994), thus 
potentially providing some protection from health and lay-off shocks that limit employment and 
earnings. For example, the benefit formula replaces a higher share of earnings for people with 
low lifetime earnings than high earnings. For people who begin collecting at the normal 
retirement age, the 2007 formula sets monthly benefits equal to 90 percent of their first $680 in 
average indexed monthly earnings, 32 percent of the next $3,420 in indexed monthly earnings, 
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and 15 percent of earnings exceeding $4,100.2 Additionally, only the 35 years of highest 
earnings figure in the computation of average indexed earnings, so people do not forfeit much 
Social Security benefits if they are unable to work for more than 35 years.  
Spousal and survivor benefits also protect people who experience health and employment 
shocks that limit their lifetime earnings. Instead of receiving Social Security benefits based on 
their own earnings history, people have the option to collect benefits based on the earnings 
history of their current, divorced, or deceased spouses. People who elect benefits from current 
spouses receive payments equal to half of the spouse’s benefit if the current or divorced spouse is 
alive, or the spouse’s full benefit if the spouse is deceased. Spousal and survivor benefits can 
thus offset the loss of own Social Security retirement benefits, especially for widows and 
widowers, that can result when health problems and job loss reduce lifetime earnings. 
Additionally, Social Security provides disability insurance (DI) benefits to people who 
develop health problems that render than unable to work. To qualify, people must satisfy Social 
Security’s strict disability criteria, which requires that they have a medically determined 
disability expected to last at least 12 continuous months (or lead to death) and be unable to 
engage in “substantial gainful activity.” They must also meet Social Security’s work history and 
earnings conditions, which vary by age. Workers who become disabled at age 54, for example, 
must have worked at least eight years. Additionally, disabled workers must demonstrate recent 
work experience by having worked at least 5 of the 10 years before becoming disabled. 
                                                 
2 People who begin collecting benefits before the normal retirement age, set at age 67 for those born after 1959, will 
receive smaller payments, and those who delay benefit take-up will receive larger payments. Adults can start 
collecting retirement benefits as early as age 62. 
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Disability benefits, which do not begin for at least five months after disability onset, are based on 
lifetime earnings, adjusted to account for the relatively short work lives of DI beneficiaries.  
Securing DI benefits is often an arduous process, and Social Security denies benefits to 
many people with disabilities. In 2005, about one-half of DI applicants failed to meet the 
program’s medical criteria (Social Security Administration 2007).3 However, one recent study 
concluded that about 60 percent of applicants denied DI benefits actually had disabilities, while 
about 20 percent of those awarded benefits did not (Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust 2004). 
Further, few rejected applicants work after they are denied DI benefits (Bound 1989; Chen and 
van der Klaauw forthcoming), suggesting that many are in fact disabled. Award rates vary 
substantially across states (Social Security Advisory Board 2006), another indication that 
national, objective criteria do not solely establish disability determinations. The imperfect 
awards process may undermine the system’s ability to protect people who develop health 
problems and become unable to work.  
Previous studies have not resolved questions about how well Social Security protects 
retirement income for low-income people, including those who develop health problems and lose 
their jobs late in their careers. There is an ongoing debate about the true progressivity of the 
system. Although the Social Security benefit formula replaces a higher share of pre-retirement 
earnings for people with lower lifetime earnings than those with higher lifetime earnings, the 
system appears less redistributive once workers and their dependents are grouped together, 
because many people with low lifetime earnings receive benefits based on their spouse’s 
earnings, not their own (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001; Smith, Toder, and Iams 2001). The 
                                                 
3 Only 35 percent of all 2005 DI applicants were awarded benefits, because Social Security often denied applications 
for technical reasons, such as failure to satisfy work history requirements (Social Security Administration 2007). 
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negative relationship between income and mortality also negates some of the system’s 
redistributive properties (Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass 2000; Liebman 2002). Once Social 
Security beneficiaries begin collecting, they receive monthly payments until they die. Because 
life expectancy rises with income (Williams 1990), lower-income people tend to receive fewer 
monthly payments than higher-income people. However, many of these studies ignore Social 
Security’s DI benefits, which tend to favor people with lower lifetime earnings. Accounting for 
DI makes Social Security much more progressive (Cohen, Steuerle, and Carasso 2004). This 
study extends the debate by focusing on how well Social Security protects retirement wealth 
when workers experience health and employment shocks late in their careers, and comparing the 
impact of these shocks on Social Security wealth, employer-sponsored DB pension wealth, and 
other household wealth. 
Data and Methods 
Our data come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of older 
Americans conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan with primary 
funding from the National Institute on Aging. The survey collects detailed information on health 
status, employment, and assets. It oversamples African Americans, Hispanics, and Florida 
residents but includes sample weights used to adjust the estimates so that they represent the 
underlying national population.4 We examine workers age 51 to 55 in 1992, who were re-
interviewed every other year through 2004 (when they were age 63 to 67). After we eliminate 
                                                 
4 For additional information on the HRS, see Juster and Suzman (1995) or visit http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu. 
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respondents who drop out of the survey by 2004 (either through attrition or death) and those who 
collected Social Security disability benefits in 1992, our full sample consists of 2,829 adults.  
To calculate Social Security and pension wealth we use Social Security administrative 
records and the detailed characteristics of employer-provided pension plans that have been linked 
to many HRS respondents.5 Earnings and benefit records from the Social Security 
Administration are available for the roughly three-quarters of HRS respondents who authorized 
the release of their records. These records extend through either 1992 or 2004, depending upon 
when the respondent gave permission. Because Social Security offers benefits based on a 
spouse’s earnings, the Social Security wealth analysis excludes married respondents whose 
spouse’s administrative earnings records are not available. HRS also obtained detailed pension 
plan descriptions in 1992 and 1998 from the employers of respondents who provided contact 
information. Our sample includes 2,120 adults with complete administrative earnings records 
and 794 adults with DB pension plan information.  
Measuring Health and Employment Shocks 
The analysis begins by calculating the incidence of health and employment shocks up to age 62. 
We ignore shocks that occur at older ages. Because Social Security and most DB plans allow 
people to collect benefits at age 62, shocks that occur after age 62 likely only modestly affect 
public and private pension benefits. We classify adults as experiencing health shocks if they 
report the onset of health problems that limit the amount or type of work they can do. We 
                                                 
5 These linkages are not available in the public HRS data. Only researchers who have been granted special 
permission by HRS can gain access to these restricted datasets. 
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classify adults as experiencing an employment shock if they ever report (by age 62) being laid 
off from their job since the previous interview.  
Calculating Social Security Wealth 
We calculate Social Security wealth in 1992 and 2004 and compare the change over the period 
for adults who experience shocks and those who do not. We define Social Security wealth at the 
baseline interview as the expected present value at age 62 of future benefits based on earnings 
through 1992, assuming that workers take up benefits at age 62. Because the computation is 
based only on health and employment histories through 1992 when no one in the sample 
qualifies for DI, it excludes the value of any future Social Security disability benefits. Social 
Security wealth in 2004 is the present value at age 62 of benefits received through 2004 plus the 
expected present value of future benefits. The 2004 calculation computes benefits based on 
earnings records through benefit take-up or 2004, and assumes that take up occurs in 2005 for 
those who have not yet collected benefits. For consistency with the 1992 wealth calculation, 
2004 benefit amounts are computed from administrative earnings records (as well as self-
reported earnings between 1992 and 2004 for cases in which the administrative records do not 
extend beyond 1992), not from administrative benefit records or self-reported benefits. In both 
1992 and 2004 we also compute benefits for spouses to determine whether respondents qualify 
for Social Security spouse, divorced spouse, or survivor benefits.6 In 2004 we calculate disability 
benefits based on earnings records for respondents who received disability benefits (according to 
administrative benefit records or, if not available, self reports). All amounts are expressed in 
constant 2004 dollars, adjusted by the change in the consumer price index. 
                                                 
6 However, we lack information about survivor or divorced spouse benefits for people whose marriages ended 
before the survey began in 1992. 
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 Social Security wealth at time t, SSWt, can be expressed as 
∑
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where t is 1992 or 2004, r is the discount rate, j is age at benefit take-up, pi is the probability of 
surviving from age at time t to age i, Qi is the probability that the spouse is alive when the 
respondent is age i (conditional on being alive at time t), Bi is the Social Security benefit if the 
spouse is alive, and Si is the survivor benefit. Bi is the maximum of the Social Security benefit 
based on the respondent’s own earnings records and half of the benefit that the spouse earned, at 
age i. Si is the maximum of the respondent’s benefit and the deceased spouse’s benefit, at age i. 
Survival probabilities are based on Social Security Administration life tables, and vary by sex 
and birth cohort. The computations use a real discount rate of 3 percent and assume that no one 
survives past age 120. 
To examine how various features of Social Security may protect workers from health and 
employment shocks we also simulate Social Security wealth under the assumption that these 
features did not exist. We first remove the impact of disability benefits by calculating Social 
Security benefits for all adults (including those with disabilities) using the retired worker formula 
and not allowing take-up until age 62. We then remove spouse and survivor benefits by 
calculating Social Security wealth based solely on respondent’s own earnings records. In those 
computations, we set 
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where OSSWt is own Social Security wealth at time t (1992 or 2004), OBi is the Social Security 
benefit received at age i based on the respondent’s own earnings history, and other variables are 
as described earlier. Finally, we calculate Social Security wealth based on 40 computation years 
instead of 35 and on a flat benefit formula that replaces 45 percent of average indexed monthly 
earnings for all respondents—the mean replacement rate in our sample—instead of the 
progressive formula used in the actual computations.  
 We also test the sensitivity of our findings about total Social Security wealth by 
examining outcomes that better measure economic status in later life. Health and employment 
shocks encourage people to stop work and take up benefits early, increasing the number of 
monthly benefits they receive but shrinking each payment. Social Security reduces monthly 
retirement benefits (but not DI benefits) for those who begin collecting before the normal 
retirement age, currently set at 66, to offset the higher number of payments that early claimants 
receive. For example, adults who begin collecting retirement benefits in 2007 at age 62, the 
earliest possible age, receive each month only 75 percent as much as they would have received if 
they had waited until age 66 to claim benefits. Although Social Security does not reduce DI 
benefits received before the normal retirement age, DI beneficiaries forfeit the chance to earn 
delayed retirement credits, which increases monthly Social Security payments for those who wait 
until they have past the normal retirement age to claim benefits. For example, adults age 62 in 
2007 can raise their monthly retirement benefits by 32 percent by claiming benefits at age 70 
instead of age 66. 
We investigate the impact on later-life outcomes in two ways. First, we compute 2004 
Social Security wealth excluding benefits received before age 62, so the measure better reflects 
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benefits received after traditional retirement ages. Second, we compute annual Social Security 
payments received at the time of benefit take-up, measured in constant 2004 dollars. Social 
Security’s automatic cost-of-living adjustments generally hold the initial annual payment’s real 
value constant over time, so take-up amounts provide a reasonable measure of real Social 
Security benefits in later life.7 As in the wealth calculations, we assume that take-up occurs in 
2005 for people who did not yet begin collecting benefits in 2004 (when respondents in the 
sample range from age 63 to 67).  
Calculating Pension Wealth 
The analysis computes DB pension wealth accumulated through 1992 and 2004 for those who 
experience shocks and those who do not. Pension benefits are estimated from pension plan 
descriptions, Social Security earnings records, and self-reported hire and quit dates, under the 
assumption that workers take-up benefits as soon as they are eligible after separating from their 
employers.8 Pension wealth at the first interview is based on earnings through 1992, and 2004 
pension wealth is based on earnings through take-up of benefits. Pension wealth at time t, PWt, 
can be expressed as 
∑
=
−+=
120
)62()1(ji i
i
it r
MpPW , 
                                                 
7 However, real monthly Social Security payments sometimes increase when beneficiaries become widowed and 
receive benefits based on their deceased spouse’s earnings instead of their own, or when people receiving disability 
benefits choose to collect retirement benefits based on their spouse’s earnings. Monthly payments also sometimes 
increase when people work and earn additional Social Security credits after they begin collecting benefits. 
8 The HRS provides a pension benefits calculator that uses summary plan descriptions, job start and end dates, and 
earnings records. The calculator’s default setting estimates pension benefits based on annual earnings in 1992. 
However, we run the calculator on Social Security covered earnings records between the job start and end dates.  
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where Mi is pension benefits received at age i and other variables are as defined earlier. 
Estimates are reported in constant 2004 dollars. 
Estimated pension wealth does not include benefits from past jobs or jobs that began after 
1992. This limitation causes us to understate true pension wealth, especially for workers laid off 
from their pension job who become re-employed at another pension job. The bias is likely to be 
modest, however, because workers accumulate most of their DB pension wealth in their 50s, and 
only 13 percent of respondents in our sample have DB pension coverage from a job that they 
started after 1992.  
Measuring Other Household Wealth  
Finally, we examine how the change over the sample period in all other net household wealth 
varies by the presence of negative shocks. All other wealth includes the value of housing, bank 
accounts, stocks, bonds, other real estate, IRAs, vehicles, and businesses, net of mortgage and 
other debt, expressed in constant 2004 dollars. We divide all other wealth by two for married and 
partnered respondents to make it comparable with Social Security and pension wealth, which are 
individual as opposed to household measures.  
Modeling Financial Impact of Negative Shocks 
The analysis isolates the effect of health and employment shocks by estimating separate 
regressions of the change in Social Security, pension, and other household wealth over the period 
and the change in expected annual Social Security benefits. We use ordinary least squares for the 
Social Security and pension equations, but median regression for other household wealth because 
it is highly skewed. The regressions include variables indicating the onset of health-related work 
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limitations and layoffs. They also control for race, education, the onset of widowhood and 
divorce, and certain baseline characteristics, including health-related work limitations, age, 
martial status, and earnings (measured in constant 2004 dollars). Additionally, we estimate 
specifications that control for Social Security disability benefit receipt. As noted earlier, 
relatively few people with disabilities qualify for Social Security disability (Benitez-Silva, 
Buchinsky, and Rust 2004), and rejected applicants may be especially needy.  
Results 
In our full sample, consisting of workers age 51 to 55 in 1992, one-quarter develop health-related 
work limitations and just more than one-fifth are laid off from their jobs before age 62 (table 1). 
The incidence of employment and (especially) health shocks declines with educational 
attainment. Nearly one-third of workers who did not complete high school develop health 
problems, almost twice the disability rate for college graduates. Workers without high school 
diplomas are about 28 percent more likely to be laid off than those with college degrees. Women 
and African Americans are more likely than men and other racial groups to experience health 
shocks before age 62. For instance, 31 percent of African Americans develop health-related work 
limitations, compared with just one-quarter of non-Hispanic whites. African American workers, 
however, are less likely to be laid off than other racial groups. Job displacement rates do not vary 
much by gender or marital status. 
 The last two columns of table 1 show the incidence of health and employment shocks in 
the selected samples we use for the Social Security and pension wealth analyses. The incidence 
of shocks in the Social Security sample is very similar to the full sample, suggesting that 
restricting the sample to respondents matched to Social Security earnings records does not bias 
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Health-Related Work Limitation
All 25 26 22
Gender
Male 23 24 21
Female 27 ** 27 23
Marital Status
Married 25 25 21
Single 27 26 22
Education
Not high school graduate 32 32 25
High school graduate 26 ** 26 ** 25
College graduate 17 ** 17 ** 16 *
Race and Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 25 25 22
African American 31 ** 34 ** 27
Hispanic 22 21 15
Job Layoff
All 21 22 14
Gender
Male 21 23 17
Female 21 21 11 **
Marital Status
Married 20 21 14
Single 23 24 17
Education
Not high school graduate 23 26 17
High school graduate 21 22 * 14
College graduate 18 ** 17 ** 14
Race and Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 21 22 15
African American 15 ** 16 ** 9 *
Hispanic 24 22 17
Number of Observations 2,829 2,120 794
Full Sample Social Security Sample
DB Pension 
Sample
Table 1. Incidence of Health and Employment Shocks between 1992 and the Year Respondents Turn 62, 
Workers Age 51-55 in 1992 (%)
Source:  Authors' estimates from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Note: Asterisks indicate that the percentage for the given category differs significantly from the percentage for 
the first category in the group  ( * p  < .10;   ** p  < .05).
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our results much. The incidence of shocks in the pension sample, however, is somewhat lower 
than in the full sample, either because workers in DB plans are less likely to experience these 
shocks than other workers or because respondents linked to DB plan data differ somewhat from 
all workers with DB plans.  
Impact of Shocks on Social Security Wealth 
Table 2 shows the change in Social Security wealth between 1992 and 2004 for workers who 
experience health and employment shocks and those who do not. Average Social Security wealth 
for all workers is about $130,000 at baseline (discounted to age 62 and expressed in 2004 
dollars), and increases by about $40,000 over the period. Most of this growth arises from the 
additional earnings that workers accumulated between 1992 and 2004. Initial Social Security 
Table 2: Change in Social Security Wealth between 1992 and 2004, by Onset of Health and Employment
Shocks, Workers Age 51-55 in 1992
N Percent      Change 
All 2120 129,706 169,950 40,244 31.0
Health-Related Work Limitation
Never 1419 133,806 171,314 37,508 28.0
Not at Baseline, Onset by Last 
Interview 494 122,873 ** 170,321 47,448 38.6
Limitation at First Interview 206 116,891 ** 159,590 * 42,699 36.5
Job Layoff
Never 1635 128,990 169,910 40,920 31.7
Laid Off by Last Interview 485 132,048 170,083 38,035 28.8
Mean Value, 1992 
($)
Mean Value, 
2004 ($)
Absolute 
Change 
($)
Source:  Authors' calculations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes:  All financial amounts are expressed in constant 2004 dollars. Health-related work limitations and job layoffs are restricted 
to those that occur before age 62.  Estimates are weighted to account for the HRS sampling probabilities.  Social Security wealth is 
the expected present value at age 62. Asterisks in the mean value columns indicate that the value for the given category differs 
significantly from the value for the first category in the group  ( * p < .10;  ** p < .05).
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wealth for workers who never report a health-related work limitation is about $11,000 more than 
for those who develop work limitations by age 62 (but do not report any at baseline) and about 
$17,000 more than for those who report work limitations at baseline. However, average Social 
Security wealth grows more rapidly over the period, in both absolute and relative terms, for 
workers who experience health shocks than for those who do not. Baseline Social Security 
wealth for workers who experience employment shocks is slightly higher than for those who are 
never laid off, but it grows somewhat more slowly over the period.  
 The first column of table 3 reports regression results of the change in Social Security 
wealth under existing law. (The appendix table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables and regressors in each model.) After controlling for baseline characteristics and the 
onset of widowhood and divorce we find that job layoffs significantly reduce Social Security 
wealth accumulation by about $4,700, or 11.9 percent of the average increment. However, health 
shocks increase Social Security wealth by about $10,600 over the period, a 26.6-percent increase 
above the average growth. The presence of health-related work limitations at baseline also 
significantly boosts the Social Security wealth growth rate.  
The positive impact of health shocks on the accumulation of Social Security wealth may 
result from features of the system that weaken the connection between lifetime earnings and 
Social Security wealth. The progressive benefit formula; spouse, survivor, and disability 
benefits; and the inclusion of only the worker’s highest 35 years of earnings in the benefit 
formula likely reduce the impact of health shocks. Disability benefits are likely to be especially 
important. Workers who experience health-related work limitations may qualify for disability 
benefits before reaching retirement age and begin receiving payments based on a formula that  
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Table 3. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Change in Social Security Wealth Between 1992 and 2004
(with Standard Errors in Parentheses and Coefficients Expressed as Percent of Mean Wealth Change in Brackets)
Onset of Health-Related Work Limitation 10,575 *** -3,822 *** -5,200 *** -7,864  *** 
         (1,408)            (879)               (719)                      (935)
 [26.6]  [-11.6]  [-15.7]  [-18.6] 
Job Layoff -4,734 *** -3,030 *** -3,649 *** -4,051  *** 
         (1,506)            (941)               (769)                   (1,001)
 [-11.9]  [-9.2]  [-11.0]  [-9.6] 
Health-Related Work Limitation in 1992 7,568 *** -2,274 * -3,653 *** -2,265   
         (2,089)         (1,304)            (1,067)                   (1,388)
Married in 1992 -2,036 -2,765 *** -451 -214  
         (1,507)            (941)               (770)                   (1,001)
Male 7,254 *** 4,277 *** 1,545 ** 8,855 ***
         (1,330)           (830)              (679)                      (883)
Education
Not High School Graduate 1,453 -2,992 *** -2,415 *** -4,524 ***
         (1,533)           (957)              (783)                   (1,018)
[Reference: High School Graduate]  —  —  —  — 
College Graduate 3,500 ** 5,043 *** 6,043 *** 7,488 ***
         (1,623)         (1,013)               (828)                   (1,078)
Race and Ethnicity
African American 237 -98 -26 -279
         (1,889)         (1,180)               (965)                   (1,255)
Hispanic -3,209 955 1,907 * -1,443
         (2,216)        (1,384)           (1,132)                   (1,472)
[Reference: Non-Hispanic White and Other]  —  —  —  — 
Age in 1992 -1,515 *** -600 ** -493 ** -1,587 ***
            (432)            (270)               (221)                      (287)
Annual 1992 Earnings (in 2004 constant dollars) 0.426 *** 0.409 *** 0.432 *** 1.008 ***
(0.030)          (0.02) (0.015) (0.020)
Widowed after 1992 17,774 *** 15,950 *** -4 -343
         (2,342)         (1,463)            (1,196)                   (1,556)
Divorced after 1992 -4,251 -665 2,081 -613
         (2,840)         (1,773)            (1,450)                   (1,886)
Constant 101,311 *** 53,399 *** 48,037 *** 96,538 ***
       (23,021)       (14,374)          (11,755)                 (15,292)
Mean Change in Social Security Wealth 39,762 32,951 33,042 42,353
R2 0.179 0.328 0.425 0.687
* p  < .10;    ** p  < .05;   *** p  <.01
Alternative Social Security Wealth Scenarios
Actual Social 
Security 
40 Computation Years, 
Flat Benefit Formula, No 
Spouse, Survivors, or 
Disability Benefits 
No Spouse, 
Survivors, or 
Disability Benefits 
No Disability 
Benefits
Source:  Authors' computations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes: The sample consists of 2,120 people who in 1992 are working and ages 51 to 55.  Health-related work limitations and job layoffs are restricted to those that occur before 
age 62.  Social Security wealth is the expected present value at age 62 and is expressed in 2004 real dollars.
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does not penalize them for relatively short careers (with limited earnings histories) and does not 
subject them to actuarial reductions for collecting benefits early.  
To examine how well these Social Security features protect workers, we simulate Social 
Security wealth under three scenarios in which benefits are more directly related to lifetime 
earnings. The first scenario, reported in the second column of table 3, computes Social Security 
benefits as if the system’s disability component did not exist. Controlling for other factors, we 
find that the onset of health-related work limitations reduces the growth in Social Security wealth 
outside of the disability program by about $3,800, equal to 11.6 percent of the average growth. 
Eliminating disability benefits, then, reduces Social Security wealth accumulations by about 
$14,400 for those who develop health problems. Under the second scenario, which assumes that 
Social Security spouse, survivor, and disability benefits do not exist, the negative impact of 
health shocks increases to $5,200, or 15.7 percent of the average gain in Social Security wealth 
under this scenario. Finally, when we calculate Social Security wealth without disability, spouse, 
or survivors benefits using a formula that incorporates the top 40 years of earnings and replaces a 
constant 45 percent of average indexed earnings for all workers, the negative impact of health 
shocks jumps to about $7,900, equal to 18.6 percent of the average change in wealth.  
Stripping these program features from Social Security has smaller effects on the 
estimated impact of layoffs. We did not expect that eliminating disability benefits would 
influence the effect of layoffs. Surprisingly, however, we find that eliminating DI reduces 
layoffs’ impact on Social Security wealth by about $1,700, although the reduction relative to the 
average wealth change is modest. Further eliminating survivor and spouse benefits and the 
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progressive benefit formula from Social Security raises the negative effect of job displacement 
on Social Security wealth by about $1,000.  
Earnings and demographic characteristics also influence Social Security wealth 
accumulation. Wealth is positively related to baseline earnings and negatively related to age 
(because older workers have less time to amass additional wealth than younger workers). Men 
and workers who become widowed also experience relatively rapid growth in Social Security 
wealth. Men work and earn more in their 50s than women, boosting their wealth holdings. 
Widowhood increases Social Security wealth by enabling people to collect their deceased 
spouse’s full benefit if it exceeds what they would receive from their own earnings. Most people 
who become widowed in their 50s are women (Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello 2005), who tend 
to earn less over their lifetime than men. 
Impact on Social Security Payments in Old Age 
Although Social Security—particularly the system’s disability insurance component—appears to 
preserve retirement wealth for people with disabilities, disability onset might reduce monthly 
benefits at older ages. Many people who develop disabilities respond by leaving the labor force 
and taking Social Security benefits early (Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 1996). Social Security 
wealth may increase when people qualify for DI because they can collect Social Security for 
many years, beginning before age 62. However, their monthly benefits in old age may not be 
particularly large. Additionally, many people with work disabilities do not collect DI, because 
they fail the medical screening or they do meet the work history requirements. For example, only 
24 percent of respondents with disabilities in our sample receive DI benefits. Workers with 
disabilities who retire early and collect Social Security early but do not qualify for DI receive 
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lower monthly payments than they otherwise would, because the system reduces retirement 
benefits for those who collect before the normal retirement age. These actuarial reductions do not 
necessarily lower Social Security wealth. Instead, they are designed to offset the higher number 
of payments received by early claimants. Nonetheless, disability onset could jeopardize 
retirement income security by lowering old-age payments.  
The first column of table 4 partly addresses this possibility by showing regression results 
of the change in Social Security wealth after excluding wealth derived from benefits received 
before age 62. After controlling for other factors, we see that post-age-62 Social Security wealth 
grows significantly faster for workers who develop a health-related work limitation than those 
Table 4. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of the Change Between 1992 and 2004 in Social Security Wealth  
Excluding Benefits Received Before Age 62 and in Annual Social Security Benefits
(with Standard Errors in Parentheses, Coefficients Expressed as Percent of Mean Wealth Change in Brackets)
Onset of Health-Related Work Limitation 2,490 *** -220 ***
                            (947)                      (92)
 [6.9]  [-9.2] 
Health-Related Work Limitation in 1992 1,401 -195
                         (1,405)                    (136)
Mean Change in Social Security Wealth or Benefits 35,966 2,385
R2 0.284 0.190
* p  < .10;    ** p  < .05;   *** p  <.01
Change in Social Security 
Wealth, Excluding Benefits 
Received Before Age 62
Change in Expected 
Annual Social 
Security Benefits
Source:  Authors' computations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes: Regressions also control for job layoffs; onset of widowhood and divorce; education; race and ethnicity; gender; and baseline age, 
marital status, and annual earnings.  Health-related work limitations and job layoffs are restricted to those that occur before age 62.  Social 
Security wealth is the expected present value at age 62. The sample consists of 2,120 people who in 1992 are working and ages 51 to 55. 
Annual Social Security benefits are measured at benefit take-up, assumed to occur at age 62 or in 2005 for those who had not yet collected 
by 2004. Both measures are expressed in 2004 constant dollars.
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who do not, but the difference is only about $2,500, much smaller than the advantage in total 
Social Security wealth accruing to workers with disabilities. About three-quarters of the higher 
growth in total Social Security wealth that they experience comes from benefits received before 
age 62. Nonetheless, the onset of work disabilities raises the growth in Social Security wealth 
after age 62 by about 7 percent. Baseline work disabilities do not significantly affect Social 
Security wealth accumulations after age 62.  
A more direct way to assess the impact of health shocks on Social Security income in 
later life is to estimate a regression of initial annual Social Security payments, which generally 
maintain their real value throughout retirement. The second column of table 4 reports results 
from this regression. The onset of work disabilities reduces expected annual Social Security 
benefits by $220, or 9.2 percent of the mean change in annual Social Security benefits between 
1992 and 2004, after other factors are held constant. These results suggest that people who 
develop disabilities tend to retire early, limiting their annual Social Security benefits but raising 
the value of their lifetime benefits. 
The impact of health shocks on Social Security wealth may be much more severe for 
those workers who do not receive DI benefits. About three-quarters of the workers in our sample 
who report developing health problems that limit the type or amount of work they can perform 
do not collect any DI benefits. Table 5 shows results from regressions of the change in total 
Social Security wealth and the change in expected annual Social Security benefits between 1992 
and 2004 that control for the receipt of DI benefits. Social Security wealth grows by about 
$61,700 for those who develop work limitations but receive DI benefits, about 155 percent of the 
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average increase over the period.9 However, the growth in wealth falls by about $2,400, or 5.9 
percent, for those who develop health problems but never receive DI benefits. Following the 
same pattern, the onset of work disabilities increases expected annual Social Security benefits by 
about $600 for those who receive DI benefits (after other factors are held constant), but reduces 
annual benefits growth by about $400 for those without DI benefits.  
The erosion in Social Security wealth and benefits associated with disability onset is 
modest for those who do not receive DI when compared to total Social Security wealth and 
benefits. By the time workers have reached their early 50s, they have already accumulated about 
                                                 
9 The impact equals the sum of the coefficients on the receipt of DI benefits and the onset of a work limitation. 
 
Table 5. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of the Change in Social Security Wealth and Annual Social Security Benefits 
Between 1992 and 2004, Controlling for DI Onset 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses and Coefficients Expressed as Percent of Mean Change in Brackets)
Onset of Health-Related Work Limitation -2,353 ** -424 ***
              (1,171)                        (96)
 [-5.9]  [-17.8] 
Receipt of Disability Insurance Benefits 64,031 *** 1,009 ***
              (1,802)                      (147)
 [161.0]  [42.3] 
Health-Related Work Limitation in 1992 -1,368 -336 ***
              (1,671)                      (136)
Mean Change in Social Security Wealth 39,762  — 
Mean Change in Annual Social Security Benefits  — 2,385
R2 0.483 0.208
* p  < .10;    ** p  < .05;   *** p  <.01
Change in Expected Annual 
Social Security Benefits
Change in Social 
Security Wealth
Source:  Authors' computations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes: Regressions also control for job layoffs; onset of widowhood and divorce; education; race and ethnicity; gender; and baseline age, marital 
status, and annual earnings.  Health-related work limitations and job layoffs are restricted to those that occur before age 62.  Social Security 
wealth is the expected present value at age 62. Annual Social Security benefits are measured at benefit take-up, assumed to occur at age 62 in 
1992 and in 2005 for the 2004 computation for those who had not yet collected. Both measures are expressed in 2004 constant dollars. The 
sample consists of 2,120 people who in 1992 are working and ages 51 to 55. 
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three-quarters of their lifetime Social Security wealth. The average $2,400 loss in wealth that we 
attribute to disability onset after age 50 amounts to only about 1 percent of average total Social 
Security wealth. Similarly, the $400 loss in annual Social Security benefits equals only about 4 
percent of the average $11,300 annual payment received (or expected) by our sample 
respondents. 
Impact on Pension and Other Household Wealth 
Health and employment shocks have more serious effects on employer-sponsored pension wealth 
and other wealth held outside of Social Security. Table 6 shows the change in DB pension wealth 
and other per capita household wealth between 1992 and 2004 for adults who experience health 
and employment shocks and those who do not. Overall, mean pension wealth increases from 
about $166,000 to $246,000 over the period. Pension wealth is somewhat lower at the baseline 
interview for those who later experience health shocks during the period but higher for those 
who are eventually laid off (although none of these differences are statistically significant). 
Pension wealth grows more slowly over the period in absolute and relative terms for those who 
experience work disabilities and layoffs. Mean other household wealth increases from about 
$172,000 to $323,000 between 1992 and 2004. However, the baseline level and change over the 
period is more modest for median other household wealth, which increases from about $79,000 
to $122,000. For both mean and median other household wealth, baseline levels and changes are 
smaller for those who experience health and employment shocks than those who do not. 
Table 7 reports regression results of the change in DB pension wealth and other 
household wealth. Late-career health and employment shocks sharply reduce DB pension wealth.
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 Table 6. Change in Pension Wealth and Other Household Wealth between 1992 and 2004,
by Onset of Health and Employment Shocks 
N
Percent 
Change 
MEAN PENSION WEALTH
All 794 165,657 245,769 80,111 48.4
Health-Related Work Limitation
Never 592 169,370 253,709 84,340 49.8
Not at Baseline, Onset by Last 
Interview 156 156,521 222,113 65,592 41.9
Limitation at First Interview 46 148,488 221,873 73,385 49.4
Job Layoff
Never 680 162,903 245,588 82,685 50.8
Laid Off by Last Interview 114 180,785 246,762 65,977 36.5
MEAN OTHER HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
All 2829 172,201 322,762 150,561 87.4
Health-Related Work Limitation
Never 1878 195,077 375,203 180,127 92.3
Not at Baseline, Onset by Last 649 128,323 ** 213,509 ** 85,185 66.4
Limitation at First Interview 300 117,584 ** 216,678 ** 99,094 84.3
Job Layoff
Never 2195 186,348 354,359 168,011 90.2
Laid Off by Last Interview 634 124,686 ** 216,639 ** 91,954 73.7
MEDIAN OTHER HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
All 2829 78,926 121,500 42,574 53.9
Health-Related Work Limitation
Never 1878 88,140 149,000 60,860 69.0
Not at Baseline, Onset by Last 649 61,431 ** 88,100 ** 26,669 43.4
Limitation at First Interview 300 59,762 ** 71,500 ** 11,738 19.6
Job Layoff
Never 2195 80,128 130,250 50,122 62.6
Laid Off by Last Interview 634 75,787 ** 105,400 ** 29,613 39.1
1992 Value     
($)
2004 Value     
($)
Absolute 
Change ($)
Source:  Authors' estimates from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes:  The sample consists of people who are working and age 51 to 55 in 1992. Health-related work limitations and job layoffs are 
restricted to those that occur before age 62.  Estimates are weighted to account for HRS sampling probabilities.  Pension wealth is the 
expected present value at age 62.  Household wealth is divided by two for married or partnered respondents. Both pension wealth and 
other household wealth are expressed in 2004 constant dollars. Asterisks in the value columns indicate that the mean or median for the 
given category differ significantly from the value for the first category in the group  ( * p < .10;  ** p < .05).
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Controlling for other factors, the regressions show that layoffs reduce pension wealth by about 
$29,900, or 37.1 percent of the average growth in pension wealth over the period (and 12 percent 
of average total pension wealth). The onset of work disabilities reduces wealth by about $17,800, 
or 22.2 percent of the average pension wealth increment over the period (and 7 percent of 
average total pension wealth). DB pension wealth also increases with baseline earnings, and 
grows significantly more rapidly among college graduates than plan participants with less 
education and among African Americans than whites. Pension wealth growth slows as age 
increases. 
Health problems significantly slow the accumulation of household wealth held outside of 
Social Security and employer-sponsored pensions in the years leading up to retirement. The 
onset of work disabilities reduces the growth in per capita household assets, excluding Social 
Security and DB pensions, by about $9,800, equal to 31.8 percent of the median increase in 
wealth between 1992 and 2004 but only 8 percent of the median asset level in 2004. Job layoffs 
reduce the growth in wealth by about $4,400 (equal to 14.2 percent of the median increment), but 
the effect is not statistically significant. Other household wealth increases with education and 
baseline earnings. The growth rate is also lower for African Americans and Hispanics than 
whites.  
Conclusions 
Work disabilities in the years leading up to retirement erode DB pension wealth and other non–
Social Security wealth, but Social Security’s disability benefits provide important protections. 
Workers who develop health problems that limit employment forfeit nearly one-
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Table 7. Coefficients from Regressions of the Change in Pension Wealth and Other Household Wealth Between
1992 and 2004 (with Standard Errors in Parentheses and Coefficients Expressed as Percent of Mean or Median
Wealth Change in Brackets)
Onset of Health-Related Work Limitation -17,839 * -9,780  *** 
                   (9,155)                           (3,752)
 [-22.2]  [-31.8] 
Job Layoff -29,869 *** -4,364   
                 (11,022)                           (4,050)
[-37.1]  [-14.2] 
Health-Related Work Limitation in 1992 8,027 -3,969   
                (16,195)                          (5,310)
Married in 1992 -1,861 6,206   
                   (9,242)                           (4,119)
Male -7,486 -3,080   
                   (8,241)                           (3,479)
Education
Not High School Graduate -21,241 * -8,664  ** 
                 (10,873)                           (4,026)
[Reference: High School Graduate] —  — 
College Graduate 35,200 *** 53,607  *** 
                  (8,632)                          (4,331)
Race and Ethnicity
African American 34,125 *** -16,245  *** 
                (10,744)                          (4,713)
Hispanic 7,886 -10,740  * 
                (15,206)                          (5,670)
[Reference: Non-Hispanic White or other]  —  — 
Age in 1992 -9,115 *** -198   
                  (2,697)                          (1,148)
Annual 1992 Earnings (in 2004 constant dollars) 0.950 *** 0.819  *** 
(0.170) (0.061)
Widowed after 1992 -931 5,533   
                (15,382)                          (6,081)
Divorced after 1992 -6,777 6,595   
                 (17,566)                           (7,087)
Constant 524,409 *** 25,080   
               (143,265)                         (61,035)
N                        794                           2,829 
Mean Change in Pension Wealth                    80,448  — 
Median Change in Other Household Wealth — 30,755                        
R2                     0.125  — 
Pseudo R2 — 0.033
* p  < .10;    ** p  < .05;   *** p  <.01
Change in Pension 
Wealth
Median Change in Other 
Household Wealth
Source:  Authors' computations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Notes:  Estimates of the change in pension wealth are from OLS regression, and estimates of the change in other household wealth are 
from median regression. The sample is restricted to people who in 1992 are working and ages 51 to 55. Health-related work limitations 
and job layoffs are restricted to those those occur before age 62.  Pension wealth is the expected present value at age 62.  Household 
wealth is divided by two for married or partnered respondents.  Both pension wealth and other household wealth are expressed in 2004 
real dollars.
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fourth of the increase in DB pension wealth that they would have otherwise realized in their 50s 
and early 60s, and nearly one-third of other non-Social Security wealth. Because of the presence 
of disability benefits, however, the onset of work limitations in the years before age 62 actually 
increases Social Security wealth. If the Social Security system did not include disability 
insurance, work limitations would substantially reduce Social Security wealth. Social Security’s 
survivor and spouse benefits and progressive benefit formula also protect workers who develop 
health problems, although their impact is relatively modest.  
Despite the protections offered by Social Security, many people who develop disabilities 
late in their working lives experience economic hardship in subsequent years. Only 24 percent of 
the workers in our sample who report developing work limitations go on to collect Social 
Security DI benefits and reap large gains in Social Security wealth. Most workers who develop 
health problems lose Social Security wealth, although the losses are relatively modest. Our 
computations may understate Social Security wealth declines, however, because we assume that 
people who develop work disabilities live as long (and collect benefits as long) as those who do 
not develop disabilities. In fact, people who receive DI benefits have much higher mortality rates 
than other people, although the gap has narrowed recently (Zayatz 2005). Additionally, workers 
who become disabled experience sharp income declines before age 62 (Congressional Budget 
Office 2004), even if Social Security wealth rises. And the boost in overall Social Security 
wealth following disability onset results primarily from early benefit receipt. Instead of having to 
wait until age 62 to receive Social Security benefits, DI beneficiaries can begin collecting 
payments as early as five months after disability onset. Monthly Social Security payments in old 
age are not much higher for DI beneficiaries than for nondisabled people with otherwise similar 
characteristics. Workers with disabilities who do not collect DI end up with lower monthly 
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benefits, because they tend to retire early and Social Security reduces the monthly payments 
received by those who collect retirement benefits before the normal retirement age. Finally, of 
course, people who develop disabilities after age 50—the population we examine in this study—
may have better retirement outcomes than people who develop problems at younger ages. About 
one-half of those awarded DI in 2005 were younger than age 50 (Social Security Administration 
2007). 
Layoffs also erode Social Security wealth. However, long-term employment effects 
appear to be smaller for late career layoffs than work disabilities. For example, after excluding 
the value of disability insurance benefits, we find that disability onset reduces Social Security 
wealth more sharply than job layoffs, and layoffs do not significantly erode household wealth 
held outside of Social Security or employer-sponsored DB plans. Many workers who lose their 
jobs in their 50s and 60s may eventually find new employment, or their spouses may increase 
their labor supply to partly offset the loss in family income. Despite the well-known employment 
challenges faced by displaced workers, especially those nearing retirement (Chan and Stevens 
2001; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993), these results suggest that job layoffs have less 
serious long-term employment effects than health problems.  
In contrast to Social Security, traditional employer-sponsored DB plans severely penalize 
workers who experience late-career job layoffs or health problems. Workers who are laid off in 
their 50s and early 60s lose an estimated 37 percent of the pension wealth they would have 
otherwise accumulated between their early 50s and age 62. The impact is large because workers 
laid off in the years immediately before retirement miss out on the large run-up in pension wealth 
that typically occurs just before workers qualify for benefits. Covered workers who experience 
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health problems lose about 22 percent of the DB pension wealth they would have otherwise 
accumulated late in their careers.  
These results underscore the risks facing workers in traditional DB plans. Many 
observers lament the steady decline in traditional DB coverage and the growth in 401(k)-type 
plans that make workers responsible for their own retirement security (e.g., Hacker 2006). To 
accumulate sizable retirement benefits in a 401(k) plan, for example, workers must generally 
choose to devote a portion of their paycheck to retirement savings, make sizeable contributions 
throughout their working lives, invest their contributions wisely, and resist the temptation to cash 
out their accounts if they separate from their employer before retirement. The stock market’s 
vagaries may erode 401(k) balances even for those workers who follow these prudent measures. 
Traditional DB plans, however, involve other types of risks with potentially serious 
consequences for retirement security. DB plan participants who leave their employer before 
retirement—because of health problems, layoffs, employer bankruptcy, or the lure of better 
opportunities elsewhere—often end up with relatively few benefits. 
Although the current Social Security system appears to provide some important 
protections to people experiencing adverse health and employment shocks late in their careers, 
the system’s growing financial pressures could soon tear the safety net. Disability benefit costs 
have been soaring recently (Autor and Duggan 2006), and the DI trust fund now pays more in 
benefits than it receives in taxes. Current projections indicate that the trust fund will be depleted 
by 2026 (Social Security Board of Trustees 2007). Population aging threatens to bankrupt the 
entire Social Security system, with the combined trust fund expected to be depleted by 2041, 
according to the latest projections. How policymakers address this fiscal challenge has crucial 
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implications for people who experience late-career health and employment shocks. Efforts to 
control DI costs by tightening eligibility or cutting benefits could erode protections for workers 
developing disabilities. Raising Social Security’s early entitlement and normal retirement ages 
could significantly erode retirement security for people unable to remain at work into their mid 
60s, especially those who do not qualify for DI. Policymakers must carefully consider how 
reforms designed to improve Social Security’s finances could unravel existing protections for 
disabled and laid-off workers.  
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The Demand for Older Workers 
Although the supply of older workers may increase in coming years, employment rates at older 
ages also depend on the demand for older workers. It is not clear how willing employers are to 
hire and retain older adults. Employment decisions hinge on perceptions of older workers’ 
productivity and the costs of employing them. On one hand, older workers are less likely to miss 
work than younger employees (Martocchio 1989), and older adults’ long experience in the labor 
force may make them especially productive. On the other hand, older workers’ education and 
skills may be outdated, and employers may view them as being less flexible than younger 
workers and less willing to experiment with new ways of working. Concern that increased age 
impairs the ability to complete physically demanding tasks may fuel employer reluctance to hire 
older people for strenuous work. These attitudes will likely evolve in coming years as the 
workforce ages, especially if labor and skill shortages develop in certain occupations.  
Change in Social Change in Change in Other
Security Wealth Pension Wealth Household Wealth
(OLS Regression) (OLS Regression) (Median Regression)
Mean Change in Social Security Wealth ($2004) 39,762 — — 
Mean Change in DB Pension Wealth ($2004) — 80,448 — 
Mean Change in Other Household Wealth ($2004) — — 123,604
Median Change in Other Household Wealth ($2004) — — 30,755
Mean
   Onset of Health-Related Work Limitation 0.26 0.22 0.26
   DI Onset 0.09 — — 
   Laid Off 0.14 0.13 0.14
   Health-Related Work Limitation in 1992 0.10 0.06 0.11
   Married in 1992 0.77 0.77 0.79
   Male 0.49 0.54 0.51
   Education
Not High School Graduate 0.26 0.16 0.27
College Graduate 0.21 0.32 0.21
   Race and Ethnicity
African American 0.13 0.16 0.15
Hispanic 0.09 0.07 0.10
   Age in 1992 52.93 52.80 52.93
   Annual Earnings in 1992 ($2004) 28,375 38,945 30,091
   Widowed after 1992 0.08 0.07 0.08
   Divorced after 1992 0.05 0.05 0.06
N 2,120 794 2,829
Appendix Table. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables
Source:  Authors' tabulations from the 1992-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Note: Tabulations are unweighted.
 
